There are serious ethical questions about generative AI, from its environmental costs and implications for employment to the appropriation of other people’s intellectual and creative labour. I share many of those concerns. But this essay is about something narrower, and more personal.
When I wrote previously about how I think with AI—using it as a conversational sparring partner to structure ideas, test arguments and interrogate my writing—the response was mostly thoughtful. But elsewhere, particularly on LinkedIn and occasionally in comments directed at me, I have encountered something stronger. Using generative AI in academic writing is not simply described as risky or unwise. It is described as morally wrong. On one occasion, the practice was described as ‘morally bankrupt’.
That is a striking phrase, and it reflects a particular intensity in the reaction to AI in academic writing. Writing sits close to the heart of what it means to be an academic. It is how we show our thinking, lay claim to our ideas and are judged by our peers. So the objection to using AI to write is not only that it might cause harm. It is that it seems dishonest—that the words, and perhaps the thinking, are not really one’s own. I understand that concern, and much of what follows takes it seriously. But the moral intensity of some of the reaction seems to me to outrun the actual shape of the problem.
In that heightened register, one side of the ethics receives rather less attention. Lowering barriers to producing academic knowledge matters too.
It matters for individuals, because academic writing is tied to publication, recognition, employment and promotion. But the stakes are larger than careers. There are people who find some of the mechanics of academic writing extraordinarily difficult who nevertheless have important things to say. Ideas, insights and potential breakthroughs sit in minds that do not easily convert complex thought into the polished, linear prose that academia rewards. Some of those ideas might change a field, alter policy or practice, or eventually improve people’s lives.
When barriers to writing keep those ideas out of the conversation, the loss extends beyond the person who struggles to publish them. It is a loss to collective knowledge.
That possibility belongs in the ethical calculation. If a technology can sometimes enable people to communicate knowledge that would otherwise remain inaccessible, we cannot evaluate it only by what it allows us to bypass. We also have to ask what it allows to become possible.
This does not settle the ethical question. But it makes blanket declarations that AI-assisted writing is inherently immoral much harder for me to accept, and it makes me wonder whether part of the unease comes from assumptions about what writing itself proves.
What do we think writing proves?
There is a familiar story about academic writing. We read. We think. We confront the blank page. We draft, delete and rewrite, and slowly, through that struggle, the argument emerges.
There is truth in this. Writing is not the transcription of completed thought. Sentences expose gaps in arguments. Trying to explain something reveals that we don’t understand it as well as we thought. Putting an argument into words forces questions of precision: is this really what I mean? Does this follow? Have I collapsed a distinction that matters?
But I am increasingly unconvinced that generating the initial words and doing that intellectual work with them are the same thing.
For me, they often compete. If a substantial part of my cognitive capacity is taken up with initiating a sentence, remembering how it began, organising it grammatically, spelling the words and holding in mind where the paragraph needs to go, there is less left over for asking what the sentence actually says. And academic writing never happens in a vacuum. Disciplinary conventions, word counts, reviewers’ expectations and institutional pressures such as REF all occupy some of the mental space in which thinking has to happen.
AI changes that distribution for me. The first words it offers do not have to be the right words. They give me something to think with, argue against and make more precise. The friction does not disappear; more of my attention goes to the friction that matters.
That is very different from a student asking an AI to read five papers they had not read, synthesise them and produce an essay which they then submit. There, almost everything the exercise was meant to accomplish has been bypassed. The student has not followed the authors’ arguments, puzzled over difficult passages, noticed tensions, weighed interpretations or worked out what they think. Nor have they done the work of selecting from that understanding and building an argument for someone else. What remains is the artefact that was supposed to be evidence of a process that never took place.
The problem there is not that the student avoided the blank page, or that a machine produced some of the words. It is that the learning did not happen. And just because some uses of AI bypass intellectual work, it does not follow that all do.
So perhaps the question is not whether AI removes struggle, but which intellectual activities a task is meant to require, and which of those AI is supporting rather than replacing.
Whose writing process have we universalised?
This matters to me particularly because I am neurodivergent. I am dyslexic and ADHD.
I cannot spell. I am quite open about this. More confusingly, I can spell the same word correctly and incorrectly in the same paragraph. I can know exactly what I want to argue while finding it extraordinarily difficult to impose the linearity needed to communicate an interconnected set of ideas. The blank page is not a neutral intellectual space for me.
None of this means I don’t need to write, or that learning to write well hasn’t mattered. I have spent a career doing precisely that. But it makes me suspicious when one process of producing prose becomes a moral benchmark for authentic intellectual work.
The conventions of academic writing are not necessarily ableist in themselves. But when facility with a particular writing process becomes a proxy for intellectual seriousness, we should ask whose capacities that process assumes. When someone says ‘just write it yourself’, they are often describing a process that has never cost them what it costs others—and it is difficult to see a cost that has never been yours.
For many neurodivergent scholars, the bottleneck is not having the idea, understanding the literature or making the connection. It is getting a complex web of thought into the sequential form academic prose demands. Everyone has finite cognitive capacity. The difference is that some parts of conventional writing consume a disproportionate share of mine, and those parts were never particularly good measures of the quality of my thinking.
The part you cannot see
There is another problem with judging intellectual labour by the production of text. Much of thinking is invisible.
Someone reading a transcript of my interactions with an AI would see me bringing ideas to it, asking questions, requesting alternative formulations, rejecting suggestions and revising text. They might reasonably conclude that the AI contributed to the writing.
It did.
But the transcript does not contain the papers I have read over decades, the connections I make away from or at the desk, the half-formed idea that sits in my head for three days before I realise what is bothering me, or everything I considered and rejected without ever typing it.
We have long since learned to be wary of the assumption that what is readily observable constitutes the whole of what is real. The same caution applies to writing. What we can see of someone’s process is not the whole of it.
Nor is the AI simply a sophisticated spellchecker. Something happens in the exchange. It can suggest a distinction I had not articulated, identify a contradiction, or offer a formulation that makes me see my own argument differently. Sometimes the thought develops through the dialogue. I bring knowledge, commitments and judgement; it brings possibilities generated from patterns in its training and the context I provide; I reject, alter or build on them.
But the relationship is not symmetrical. I care what the argument means. I have commitments to the research and to the people and ideas I work with. I have to decide whether a claim is defensible, and I have to take responsibility for it. That makes it surprisingly hard to say who ‘did the thinking’, while leaving responsibility rather less ambiguous.
It doesn’t save me time
People often assume that academics use AI because it is quicker. That isn’t my experience.
Writing a paper with AI takes me at least as long as writing without it, and sometimes longer. I argue with it. I ask it to challenge me. I reject what it produces. I go back to the literature. I re-explain things it has misread. I return to something we apparently settled two days earlier because it keeps bothering me.
But the most important time is not the time I spend at the screen.
The back and forth with an AI has a pace of its own. A response arrives in seconds, and it is easy to keep going: to ask again, adjust, accept, move on. That pace can override the urge to stop and ponder. I think this is one of the easiest ways to produce slop, even when every individual exchange feels thoughtful.
For people who write fluently, some of that pondering may happen within the writing process itself, in the pauses between sentences. For me, those pauses were never empty; they were filled with spelling, sequence and the effort of holding everything in mind. AI clears some of that away, but it does not create the pause. I have to build that in deliberately. I have to step away and let something sit.
And when the pondering works, it rarely arrives neatly. Ideas tend to come to me in big rushes, usually when I am nowhere near a computer, and because they arrive all at once, I can lose them before I get back. Making space for pondering is only half of it. The other half is catching what it produces, and then being able to act on it.
So the time this takes is not only mechanical. It is the time for the thinking that makes the rest worthwhile.
It has also changed my relationship to shame.
For most of my career, the shame I carried about my writing was attached to proofreading. I can spot errors in other people’s work with ease; I cannot see them in my own. Spelling mistakes and unpolished sentences occupied a disproportionate share of my attention and anxiety, despite saying very little about the quality of my thinking. Being able to worry less about whether a word is spelled correctly, and more about whether it is the right word, has been genuinely liberating.
But the shame has not gone. It has moved.
Now, when I ask an AI to set out a revised version of something we have been working through—to give the argument I have been building words and an order—I sometimes feel I am being lazy. Surely a proper scholar would integrate it herself?
I don’t think I am being lazy. Having the words and the order in front of me is exactly what lets me read, judge and push against them, rather than holding everything in my head while trying to build it. But the feeling lingers, and I know where it comes from. It is the ‘morally bankrupt’ comments, internalised. They carry the idea that the difficulty is the proof, even though for me the difficulty was never where the thinking lived.
Learning to listen to the niggle
The other thing AI has changed is how much attention I pay to the feeling that something is wrong before I can say what it is.
AI writes extraordinarily plausible prose. That is one of its attractions and one of its dangers. A paragraph can be elegant, coherent and entirely wrong for the argument I am making.
Sometimes the problem is obvious: a misunderstood concept, an invented causal relationship, a flattened theoretical distinction. The harder cases are when the prose looks perfect and something nevertheless niggles. Sometimes it has reproduced a conventional interpretation my argument depends on resisting. Sometimes it has resolved a tension I need to keep open, or made commensurable two things I think must stay distinct. Sometimes it has supplied a beautifully polished version of disciplinary groupthink.
Its completeness is not my completeness.
Textual completeness and intellectual completeness are different things, and fluency can conceal absence. Something I know from years of research may simply not be there. An assumption shared across much of the literature may have slipped in unnoticed. A concept may have been made cleaner than the reality it is meant to help us understand. Recognising those absences requires knowledge, and it requires judgement—which sometimes arrives before explanation.
Part of what makes the niggle possible is that the AI’s knowledge and mine are differently constituted.
My episteme is situated. It has been formed through a particular biography: decades of reading and research, conversations, empirical encounters, a great deal of thinking and pondering, much of it done while making coffee or walking somewhere else, and a reflexive attention to how writing itself works. The AI’s knowledge reflects patterns across a vast but selective body of material, shaped by what has been written down, made available and rendered legible to the model. Neither is complete. They are partial in different ways.
That difference is what makes the encounter useful. The AI is not an objective reader; it offers no view from nowhere. What I get is my own argument refracted through a differently constituted body of knowledge.
And the refraction works in both directions. Sometimes the AI misreads a distinction I am trying to make, and my first response is frustration. That isn’t what I meant. But the misreading can show me that a connection obvious to me has never actually made it onto the page—that it is obvious only from where I am standing.
That isn’t what I meant can reveal something about my communication.
That sounds right, but isn’t can reveal something about the limits of what has been generated.
So much for outsourcing the struggle.
Authorship, judgement and responsibility
This is why the distinction between AI writing and human writing seems increasingly inadequate to me.
Someone can ask an AI to generate a paper about something they barely understand, make a few superficial changes and attach their name to it. I struggle to regard that as meaningful authorship. But other uses of AI are not simply smaller steps towards it. They are a different kind of practice altogether.
Academic writing has always been more collaborative than the image of the lone author suggests. Colleagues shape our thinking. Reviewers and editors change our arguments. Co-authors rewrite our sentences. Some scholars dictate, and some rely on extensive language editing. What made us authors was never that every word was ours alone. It was that we understood the work and answered for it.
AI is different from all of these. Its scale, opacity and capacity to generate apparently knowledgeable prose matter. But those differences make it more important, not less, to ask where intellectual responsibility lies.
Who understands the argument?
Who knows the literature and evidence it rests on?
Who recognises when something important has been flattened or omitted?
Who decides what stays and what goes?
Who can explain why it matters?
Who is willing to stand behind it when somebody says it is wrong?
Those questions get closer to the ethics of authorship than asking whether every sentence began on a blank page.
Where does the niggle come from?
A fair objection to all this is that it works for me because I already have the experience. My niggle is built on decades of reading and research. What about a first-year student, or an early career researcher, who has not yet built that knowledge?
I don’t want to wave that away. AI may lower barriers most safely for those who already know a great deal, and carry most risk for those still learning.
But students face the same problem without AI. The judgement needed to read a difficult text well, and to build an argument from it, takes years to develop. It comes through practice, and it has to be taught. Much of that judgement has become tacit for experienced academics. Sometimes those best placed to make it visible are the people for whom it never came easily, because we have had to pull it apart to understand it.
AI can be one more place to practise—not faster or better, but differently. A student who has read a paper and formed a view can compare it with an AI’s summary and ask what has been smoothed over, or where it is confidently wrong. Used this way, AI makes the process of judgement visible rather than bypassing it. It does nothing for a student who uses it to avoid the reading.
This is also why I think the arts and humanities, and the interpretive traditions across the social sciences, matter more in an age of AI, not less. When fluent text is cheap, the scarce skill is no longer producing it but judging it: reading closely, weighing arguments, noticing what is missing and asking whose view of the world a text assumes. This essay itself would not exist without philosophy, literature and history. They gave me the questions to ask of the technology, and of myself.
Beyond the purity test
None of this makes the concerns about AI in academia disappear. We should worry about cognitive offloading, about students bypassing the work through which they learn, about vast quantities of text that nobody has thought through, and about fabricated references and a homogenised, polluted knowledge commons.
But worrying about how a technology is used is different from declaring its use immoral in itself. The first asks us to pay attention. The second can overlook why some people turn to it in the first place.
We have been here before. In Phaedrus (275a-b), Socrates worries that writing will weaken memory and give people the appearance of wisdom without its substance. He was not entirely wrong. Writing did change how we remember, and it has spread terrible ideas as well as good ones. But we did not conclude that writing itself was immoral. We learned, slowly and imperfectly, to ask how it was being used, by whom and for what.
My concern is that in responding to a genuinely disruptive technology, we risk turning familiar practices of scholarship into a purity test, and universalising a relationship between thinking and writing that has always worked better for some minds than for others.
I began with the charge that using AI in academic writing is morally bankrupt. I have tried to take seriously the concerns that lie behind it. But I think the charge puts the moral question in the wrong place. What matters is not whether a machine touched the words. It is whether someone has done the thinking, can explain it, and is willing to stand behind it. Those standards are more demanding than a purity test, and much harder to police. They are also the ones that have always mattered.
And there is a moral question on the other side too.
My drive is full of half-written papers. Some are unfinished because I lost confidence, some because something newer and more interesting came along, and some because they deserved to be abandoned. But many are unfinished because I struggled to write them in the way academic norms expect. I doubt I am unusual in this.
If we are going to talk about the ethics of AI in academic writing, we should be willing to count those losses as well—the arguments never made, the insights never shared, the knowledge that never reached the people who might have used it.
The blank page has never been neutral. It has simply been easier not to notice what it kept out.